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ABSTRACT
Geothermal and hydropower projects tend to be capital intensive and with long repayment periods. These projects can be challen-
ging, especially in developing and emerging countries in transition often characterized by changing and unpredictable political and 
business environments. Developing and emerging countries are eligible for support from international financial institutions (IFIs) 
such as the World Bank Group and regional development banks2 and can also receive assistance from bilateral donor institutions. 
PPPs enable pooling of public, private and donor funds for clean energy investment. A well designed PPP can be a venue for scaling 
up funding for clean energy investment internationally. However, little point exists in forming PPPs if, for example, the private sector 
partner captures most or all the benefits, or if the government keeps changing the rules of the game resulting in a non-viable project. 
The focus of this article is on PPPs, potential benefits and challenges for host governments and various partners, including the private 
sector, bilateral donors, and multilateral institutions such as IFIs. When disputes occur between the private sector and host govern-
ments, IFIs can potentially play an important role in resolving disputes and help ensure the fair sharing of the risks and the rewards 
of the PPP for all the parties involved. The objective of this article is to review some recent theoretical research recently done on PPP, 
potential benefits as well as some challenges using this model in developing and emerging countries.
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Introduct ion
Clean energy investments such as geothermal and hydropower projects tend to be large, capital intensive 
and with long repayment periods. Construction of such projects is important in developing and emerging 
countries for environmental reason and as part of the battle against climate change. Because of their long 
term nature, these investments are challenging in economies that are in transition and are often characterized 
by a changing and unpredictable political situation and unfavourable business environments. For geothermal 
projects, several models can be used to mobilize capital and cover the resource risks. These include, for 
example: (i) an enterprise in public ownership, (ii) a private company developer and (iii) a public-private 
partnership (PPP). In the first model, a public sector company would typically undertake the whole project, 
including the resource risks. This could be a combination of national and municipal authorities such as in 
the case of Iceland. In the second model, a private sector developer might be a large company with a strong 
balance sheet as in the case of Chevron in the Philippines. In this case the private company has the financial 
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capacity to undertake the whole project. In the third model the public and private sectors work in partnership, 
i.e., a public-private partnership (PPP).
The objective of the article is to analyse potential benefits and challenges of the third model, i.e., the 
use of PPPs for capital intensive clean energy projects in developing and emerging countries. This includes 
host government cooperation with the private sector (domestic and foreign), and can also involve other 
players such as international and bilateral financial institutions. This article reviews some recent theoretical 
research recently done on PPP. Methods used in the article are: analysis and synthesis. Among the sources of 
evidence used for the analysis is secondary data, including analytical reports and scholarly literature. 
1 .  Publ ic-pr ivate  par tnerships
What exactly is a public-private partnership? Many different definitions are used for PPPs by different 
individuals and institutions. One definition is that “any public sector service provided partially or wholly 
by the private sector” (Delmon, 2009: 601). Another definition is “co-operative institutional arrangements 
between public and private sector actors” (Hodge, Greve, 2009: 33). The World Bank has defined PPPs as 
“the transfer to the private sector of investment projects that traditionally have been executed or financed by 
the public sector” (World Bank, 2008: 93). The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
has defined PPPs as “long term contractual arrangements between the government and a private partner 
whereby the latter delivers and funds public services using a capital asset, sharing the associated risks” 
(OECD, 2012: 18). Notably, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and the World 
Bank definitions mention capital investment by the private sector. The other definitions are more general, 
highlighting service and cooperation.
2.  Benefi ts  f rom using PPPs
Why would governments of developing and emerging market economies want to cooperate with the pri-
vate sector under a PPP arrangement? The answer is: for several reasons. A PPP can be a feasible option for 
governments because in most developing and many emerging countries the government has limited capacity 
to mobilize funds. This means that a partnership with the private sector can help the government obtain 
much-needed long term capital. The private sector may also possess technical knowledge that the public sec-
tor does not have and be a more efficient operator of power plants.  In this case a public-private partnership 
can be formed to allow for a sharing of the risks and rewards from the project. 
PPP can be a favoured model in developing and emerging markets and be beneficial if well designed and 
if risks and rewards are shared fairly. However, little point exists in forming PPPs if, for example, the private 
sector partner captures most or all the benefits, or if the government keeps changing the rules of the game 
resulting in a non-viable project. 
With pressure on physical infrastructure and limited resources, governments of developing and emerg-
ing countries may want to cooperate with the private sector via a PPP to help finance, build, and/or operate 
public projects. While doing so, the government could at least in theory: (1) utilize the better skills and better 
management from the private sector that may lead to increased efficiency for the project in a competitive 
environment, (2) access private sector funds to undertake more projects than would be possible with public 
funds alone – this can contribute to fiscal stabilization, and increase investment and growth, (3) provide more 
affordable and better services to end-users, and (4) share risks with the private sector (see, for example, Le-
ruth, 2009; de Palma et al., 2009; Estache, 2005).
Developing and emerging economies on the one hand and high-income economies on the other may 
have different reasons for participating in public-private partnerships. As O. Hart points out, “Policy makers 
frequently argue that PPPs are good because the private sector is a cheaper source of financing or insurance 
than the public sector.” Furthermore, he emphasizes that “This thinking is strange for an economist since it 
is hard to imagine an agent that is more able to borrow or to provide insurance than the government (with 
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its enormous powers of taxation)” (Hart, 2003: C75). L. A. Leruth also argues as “the government is often 
able to borrow at [an] almost risk-free rate (no credit risk), which gives it an advantage” (Leruth, 2009: 230). 
These arguments may well be true in countries that enjoy strong creditworthiness (e.g., via AAA or ot-
her high credit rating status). The countries discussed in this article, however, are developing and emerging 
countries. They often have large unutilized energy resources and strong medium- or long-term demand for 
energy, but their creditworthiness is limited. Their nationals often have limited ability to pay for the services 
rendered to them and the government has weak capacity to force them to do so through taxation. Such go-
vernments can be risky partners for the private sector in a PPP. In this situation, efficient and effective risk 
allocation is the key to success, and the international community can play a constructive role, for example, 
through participation by IFIs, which can involve a variety of funding and mitigation instruments.
When discussing green infrastructure finance, the World Bank states that “the international community 
has recognized that the majority of new investment financing will need to come from private sources” (World 
Bank, 2012: 16). The World Bank’s focus is on developing and emerging markets. This means that some 
sort of public-private partnerships will need to be formed for a large share of clean energy investment in 
those markets in transition. This is a major challenge not only for the private sector, but also for participating 
developing and emerging countries. Moreover, as the World Bank has stated, “developing a framework for 
improved collaboration between public and private sectors could greatly benefit green infrastructure finan-
cing mechanisms” (World Bank, 2012: 6).
Interest in PPPs is growing among Asian countries, including a notably prominent market in China. 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for example recently stated that “PPPs are seen to 
be beneficial in meeting ASEAN infrastructure needs, estimated by the Asian Development Bank at USD 
60 billion per annum. Private participation in infrastructure provision can enhance existing public capacity in 
providing economic (e.g., transport, telecommunication, power, water and sanitation) and social (e.g., health 
and education) infrastructures” (ASEAN, 2014). Great need is also present in other developing and emerging 
regions such as Africa and Latin America.
3.  Chal lenges to  using PPPs
According to the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility3 countries using the PPP model need to 
have: strong institutions, legal systems and rule of law, high standards of public and corporate governance, 
transparency, competition, protection of investments, enforcement of laws, and dispute resolution mecha-
nisms (World Bank, 2015). This is an impressive list, but some would argue that it is unrealistic even for 
developed high income countries. If international financial institutions insisted that those criteria be satisfied 
before an investment could take place using the PPP model, very few places in the world would receive any 
private finance. This would especially be a challenge in developing Africa. 
Because of this challenge, key international organizations such as ASEAN, the European Union, the 
International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, and the World Bank have formulated and displayed subs-
tantial policy documents on PPPs. A recent paper on PPPs shows that international organizations use roughly 
the same categories and conceptions of stages for what is needed to establish effective PPPs (Greve, 2015). 
Multilateral as well as bilateral financial organizations can at least in theory be a catalyst in supporting 
PPP projects, including in the clean energy sector. Institutions such as the World Bank Group and regional 
development banks can, via their policy dialogue, assist governments when undertaking reforms needed for 
3 The Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility was created in 1999 to act as a catalyst to increase the private sector 
participation in emerging markets. It provides technical assistance to governments to support creation of a sound enabling 
environment for the provision of basic infrastructure services by the private sector. The Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory 
Facility is a multi-donor technical assistance facility, financed by 17 multilateral and bilateral donors: the Asian Development 
Bank, Australia, Austria, Canada, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, France, Germany, the International 
Finance Corporation, Italy, Japan, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and the World Bank. Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility funds are untied and grants are 
provided on a demand-driven basis. See further: http://www.ppiaf.org/node/23#What%20is%20PPIAF 
ISSN 2029-9370. Regional FoRmation and development StudieS, no. 1 (21)
61
effective use of the PPP model. IFI support can be important because developing and emerging countries 
often have limited capacity to negotiate with multinational enterprises. Since the Public-Private Infrastructu-
re Advisory Facility is a multi-donor technical assistance facility, financed by 17 multilateral and bilateral 
donors, it can play an important role here.
But, as mentioned before, using the PPP model and working in partnership with IFIs and bilateral devel-
opment institutions, can also come at a cost. A recent book published by the World Bank, entitled “Public Pri-
vate Partnerships in Europe and Central Asia – Designing Crisis-Resilient Strategies and Bankable Projects”, 
comments very cautiously that “working with these institutions may also lengthen the project development 
process, given specific requirements in terms of environmental and social safeguards requirements and strin-
gent procurement procedures” (Cuttaree, Mandri-Perrott, 2011: 59). Another recent book also published by 
the World Bank entitled: “Doing a dam better: the Lao People›s Democratic Republic and the story of Nam 
Theun 2 (NT2)”, is more critical when discussing the World Bank cooperation with the private sector. The 
authors simply state that: “The bad news is that the World Bank is seen as a high-cost/high-hassle partner of 
last resort. There is therefore a critical need to reduce the costs the private sector incurs for doing business 
with the World Bank. Doing so will require the World Bank to better understand the constraints under which 
the private sector works” (Porter, Shivakumar, 2010: 22). These comments are especially notable given that 
the authors have both served as the World Bank country directors. J. Shivakumar, for example, played an 
important role in enabling the Nam Theun 2 hydropower project in Lao.
4.  The chal lenges of  host  government  cooperat ion with the pr ivate  sector 
PPPs are not only a challenge for the private sector. Cooperation with a private enterprise can also be a 
serious challenge for host governments in developing and emerging market economies, especially during 
times of economic and financial crisis. In their book, Making Foreign Investment Safe – Property Rights and 
National Sovereignty, L. T. Wells and R. Ahmed (2007) document a dramatic dispute between CalEnergy, 
an entity founded as a consulting and service company for geothermal power in North America, and the 
Indonesian government. This dispute resulted in a claim under official political risk insurance filed by CalE-
nergy and paid by the US government agency, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Less dramatic, 
but still consequential, was the dispute between Enron, then a private power developer, and the Indonesian 
government, that ended with the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), the insurance agency 
of the World Bank Group, paying out its first claim ever.
As L. T. Wells and R. Ahmed state, “The Indonesian experience with official political risk insurance has 
not been the only one that has made developing countries a bit wary. From the point of view of host coun-
tries, the new property rights system was not being very constructive. The moral hazard associated with the 
insurance surely had encouraged some investors to avoid renegotiation when economic crisis hit Indonesia 
and other countries. And Indonesians saw themselves as having few rights when CalEnergy filed a claim 
with [the Overseas Private Investment Corporation] or when [the Overseas Private Investment Corporation] 
sought reimbursement from Indonesia.” (Wells, Ahmed, 2007: 246). Insurance can thus under certain con-
ditions put the host government in a very difficult position vis-à-vis a private sector investor who is insured, 
in this case with the powerful US agency Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Moreover, L. T. Wells 
and R. Ahmed also criticize the public agencies providing guarantees as follows: “Further, and unlike many 
private insurers, public agencies appear to pay little attention to actual or potential moral hazards. If [the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation] would insure only a smaller percentage of the equity, forcing more 
of the risk onto the investor, one aspect of moral hazard ought to decline. Second, allowing [the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation] to seek something less than full reimbursement from host countries would 
reduce the perception that it faces no loss if it decides to pay claims” (Wells, Ahmed, 2007: 246).
In the case of the Enron dispute in Indonesia, MIGA paid Enron in the end. MIGA then demanded reim-
bursement from the government of Indonesia and got it. A good relationship with the World Bank Group, 
which MIGA is part of, must also have been considered important for the government of Indonesia because 
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of other projects and programs that could be jeopardized in the event of an unresolved dispute. It is, however, 
questionable whether the World Bank Group should use its leverage in this way. 
While the tensions between the government of Indonesia and MIGA did not run as high as in the case 
of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, both were costly for the government of Indonesia in terms 
of money and international relations. In their concluding chapter, L. T. Wells and R. Ahmed raise doubts 
about whether the international system of property rights can accomplish its goal of encouraging foreign 
investment that is helpful for the host country. Nevertheless, and in spite of the serious problems that a host 
government can experience, they recognize the need for public-private partnerships when they state that 
“Meeting the huge infrastructure needs for development will surely require a mix of private investment, 
state investment, multilateral lending, hybrid arrangements, and very substantial aid money” (Wells, Ahmed, 
2007: 283).
IFIs are well placed to mitigate risks at competitive prices. As L. T. Wells says, “Official insurance can 
be priced low, since the threat of sanctions by the organizations backing the insurance sharply reduce the 
chances of the events being insured against occurring” (Wells, 2005: 91).
Regional and global economic crises, such as those that struck Asia in 1997/98, Argentina in 2001, and 
the whole world in 2008/09, can pose significant threats to the international investment regime. As Salacus 
(2010) states, “Countries under great stress, faced with potential social and political upheaval as a result 
of rapidly declining standards of living, often seek radical solutions and are impatient with international 
investment rules that may restrict their latitude of action. For example, during times of economic crisis, go-
vernments may be unwilling to grant national treatment to foreign investors, to avoid changing regulations 
in the name of “fair and equitable treatment,” and to refrain from seizing vital national resources held by 
foreigners simply because they have made treaty promises not to expropriate. Thus Argentina, to cope with 
one the most serious economic and financial crisis in its history in 2001–2002, took a series of measures that 
foreign investors believed violated their legal rights and economic interests, resulting in the initiation of nu-
merous investor-state arbitration claims” (Salacuse, 2010: 471). International financial institutions can play 
an important role in resolving disputes between host governments and foreign investors during economic 
and financial crises and they should make efforts to facilitate settlements that are fair for all parties involved. 
5 .  PPPs – al locat ing r isks  and shar ing rewards 
In spite of the many potential problems and issues that can be associated with public-private cooperation, 
PPPs can be a feasible platform to fund infrastructure development and to increase the efficiency of public 
sector service delivery in developing and emerging economies. The PPP becomes a venue for the public 
and private sectors to cooperate on a project that would traditionally have been in the public domain. Inf-
rastructure projects in the clean energy sector are often large, capital intensive and long term. Repayment 
periods are also often long. It can take a private investor 10 to 30 years to recover the investment and project 
returns. It is often challenging to maintain a good working relationship within a PPP for such a long time, 
while the local, regional and global environment may change dramatically during this period.
The private sector has for years been recognized as a significant financing source for meeting developing 
country investment requirements. However, financial markets remain largely untapped for this purpose and 
have yet to live up to their potential (Asian Development Bank, 2006). PPPs are one platform worth consi-
dering for the private sector to engage in infrastructure projects, including geothermal and hydropower pro-
jects. Private capital, bilateral and multilateral donor support, including IFIs, and public funds can be combi-
ned in a PPP project. A well designed policy and institutional framework for PPPs offers the opportunity to 
leverage and combine all three sources of financing and expertise without crowding out private investment. 
By forming a PPP both public and private sectors can share the risks and rewards of infrastructure projects.
Private sector funding and participation in clean energy projects is a challenge for various reasons. Among 
them is that the host government is often the only buyer of the electricity or hot water produced, i.e., it is the 
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so called offtake purchaser4. Many developing and emerging countries with large clean energy potential have 
limited creditworthiness. They have low per capita income and are often going through economic and poli-
tical transition. Developing and emerging countries can also be vulnerable during regional and global crises. 
In such cases the sponsors5 of a project may hesitate to inject funding because of uncertainty with the income 
stream from the investment. Lenders, including commercial investment banks, would also often hesitate to 
provide loans to such projects because of uncertainty whether the project company, whose income stream is 
at risk, can service its loans. Sponsors may also hesitate to provide equity capital.
To engage in cooperation, the public and private sectors can employ several different schemes6 including 
the so called BOT, i.e., Build-Operate-Transfer (International Monetary Fund, 2004). In BOT projects the 
private sector is responsible for financing, constructing and operating the project. Under this arrangement 
the host country grants a concession7, i.e., the right for a private firm to undertake a public sector project and 
operate it over an agreed period. When the concession expires the ownership of the project is transferred 
back to the party granting the concession8.
The partners typically involved in a BOT project are: the project company that undertakes the project, the 
host government (that can also be the offtake / power purchaser and guarantor), the shareholders, the lenders, 
the grantor, the construction contractor, the operator, the offtake purchaser/power purchaser, and the input 
supplier. Figure 1 below shows a typical PPP BOT contractual structure.
The project company uses the income stream from the project to service its debt and to pay returns to 
its investors9. The lenders to a BOT project might, for example, be commercial investment banks, IFIs and 
bilateral agencies. The IFIs could also serve as guarantors, e.g., for payment to the lenders, including com-
mercial investment banks. National institutions such as export credit agencies, which support trade finance 
(goods and services), can also play a constructive role in reducing the risks taken by private sector investors, 
see e.g., T. Q. Dinh and H. Þ. Hilmarsson (2012a; 2012b; 2012c and 2013).
The lenders would typically be keen to manage their risks10 and would receive a fixed margin on their 
loan whereas the shareholders11 maximize the profits on their equity investment. In addition to obtaining fun-
ding for the project, the project company procures the design and coordinates the construction and operation 
of the project in line with the requirements of the concession agreement. Project company shareholders often 
include firms with construction and operation experience, and with offtake purchase capabilities (Delmon, 
2009: 98). 
The offtake purchase agreement secures the project payment stream. The offtake purchaser will be loo-
king for guaranteed long term output from the project. The credit risk associated with the offtake purchaser 
will be of particular concern to the project company and the lenders. This is where guarantees from host 
governments or IFIs, including the World Bank, become important.
Critical to the design of PPPs is the way risks are allocated between the partners in the PPP. In fact, 
effective risk allocation is key to success in any PPP. A general principle is that risk should fall on the party 
that is abler to do something about it. Risks in PPPs tend to be allocated on the basis of commercial and 
negotiating strength. The stronger party will allocate risk that it does not want to bear to the weaker party. 
Efficient allocation of risk will generally result in a more successful and profitable project and will benefit 
each of the parties involved (Delmon, 2009). 
4 An offtake purchaser is a purchaser of the product produced by a project. In case of a power project, the product produced is the 
electricity generated. 
5 A sponsor of a project is a party wishing to develop or undertake a project. A sponsor would normally provide financial support 
for the project, e.g., early equity capital.
6 PPP schemes and modalities other than Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) include, for example: Build-Own-Operate-Transfer 
(BOOT), Build-Rent-Own-Transfer (BROT), Build-Lease-Operate-Transfer (BLOT), Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO).
7 A concession is the right granted by the host government for a private company to undertake a public sector project and operate 
it over an agreed period.
8 For a comprehensive discussion on BOTs see, for example, Jeffrey Delmon’s outstanding book on Private Sector Investment in 
Infrastructure (Delmon, 2009).
9 i.e., equity contributors to the project company.
10 i.e., they would only take measurable and measured risks.
11 i.e., equity holders in the project company.
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In order to minimize the market risk from the project company and the project lenders, an 
off take purchase agreement, or in the case of a power project, a power purchase agreement, may 
be made.  This is to create a secure payment stream which will be an important basis for fi nancing 
the project. The off take purchaser may also be the grantor, or a government entity such as a public 
utility, in which case the off take purchase agreement and the concession agreement may be one and 
the same document (Delmon, 2009).
The lenders will want project risks to be allocated to project participants, i.e., the construction 
contractor and the operator but not the project company, which is their debtor. The project company 
will enter into a contract with the construction contractor in order to divest its obligations to the 
grantor to design, build, test, and commission the project. Completion risk for the project should be 
allocated to the construction contractor. In the case of a turnkey project, completion and performance 
risk should fall on the construction contractor.
If the main risks are associated with poor management of the service, shifting the risk to the 
operator could provide the right incentives to ensure that the project delivers. If risks are related to 
changes in policies, then the government should bear the risk. This is because the project company 
will not generally be able to manage political risk. The project company will ask the government to 
bear those risks, not necessarily to claim compensation at a future date but to pressure the government 
to avoid such risks and to minimize the probability that such risk events will occur.
Figure 1. Typical PPP BOT contractual structure
Source: constructed by the author.
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Conclusions
Geothermal and hydropower projects tend to be large, capital intensive and with long repayment periods. 
Projects with such a long duration are challenging, especially in developing and emerging market economies 
that are in transition and typically characterized by a changing and unpredictable political and business envi-
ronments. PPPs enable pooling of public, private and donor funds for clean energy investment in developing 
and emerging market economies and those countries are eligible for support from international financial ins-
titutions such as the World Bank and regional development banks as well as form bilateral financial institu-
tions. A well designed PPP can be a venue for scaling up funding for clean energy internationally. However, 
little point exists in forming PPPs if, for example, the private sector partner captures most or all the benefits, 
or if the government keeps changing the rules of the game resulting in a non-viable project.
Sharing the risks and the rewards in a fair and sustainable manner is important for the success of a PPP. 
Partners of PPPs can be vulnerable, including private partners as well as host governments. During the long 
duration of geothermal and hydropower projects, economic and financial crisis can hit. Those risks should 
be factored into the project. This can result in demands for higher returns for the private sector participants. 
Crises in East Asia as well as in Latin America can give valuable lessons to the private and public sectors, as 
well as to bilateral and multilateral providers of loans, equity and guarantees. 
Reducing the risk of failure through the efficient project company’s operations as well as good govern-
ment policies is important for all parties involved. Shifting the risk to a weaker party is, however, questio-
nable; e.g., if an insured private sector participant files a claim against the host government of a developing 
country without trying to resolve issues and then an insurer, such as an International Financial Institution 
(IFIs) or a national institution, files a reclaim against the host government without making credible efforts to 
resolve the dispute. IFIs and national institutions should avoid using their leverage vis-à-vis host government 
this way.  
PPPs place a strong demand on host government capacity to communicate and negotiate both with pri-
vate participants and IFIs when these are involved. Low government capacity is an obstacle when using the 
PPP framework, but one must keep in mind that a weak government is also less likely to be able to run a 
project with 100 percent public ownership efficiently. When disputes occur between the private sector and 
host governments, IFIs can and should play a role in resolving disputes and help ensure the fair sharing of 
the risks and the rewards of the PPP for all the parties involved. 
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Siekiant vykdyti geoterminius ir hidroenerginius projektus, dažnai reikia turėti daug pradinio kapitalo 
investicijų, jų atsipirkimo laikotarpis yra gana ilgas. Šie projektai gali kelti iššūkių, ypač besivystančiose ir 
besiformuojančiose šalyse, kurios dažnai pasižymi besikeičiančia ir nenuspėjama politine bei verslo aplinka. 
Besivystančios ir besiformuojančios valstybės turi teisę gauti paramą iš tarptautinių finansinių institucijų 
(TFI), pavyzdžiui, Pasaulio Banko grupės ir regioninių plėtros bankų, be to, gali gauti pagalbą iš dvišalių 
donorų įstaigų.
Viešojo ir privačiojo sektorių partnerystė (VPSP) leidžia sutelkti viešųjų, privačių ir donorų lėšas ir in-
vestuoti jas į švarią energetiką. Gerai suformuota VPSP gali būti būdas internacionaliai didinti švarios ener-
gijos investicijų finansavimą. Tačiau nebūtina kurti VPSP, jeigu, pavyzdžiui, privačiojo sektoriaus partneris 
gauna visą naudą arba valdžia nuolat keičia žaidimo taisykles, nes tai sukuria negyvybingą ir nepraktišką 
projektą. Šio straipsnio dėmesys sutelktas į VPSP potencialią naudą ir potencialius sunkumus priimančioms 
valstybėms bei jų partneriams, įtraukiant privatųjį sektorių, dvišalius donorus, daugiašales institucijas, kaip 
TFI. Kai ginčų kyla tarp privačiojo sektoriaus ir priimančiosios vyriausybės, TFI, sprendžiant ginčus ir 
padedant užtikrinti sąžiningą dalijimąsi rizika bei VPSP naudą visoms dalyvaujančioms šalims, gali vaid-
inti svarbų vaidmenį. Šio straipsnio tikslas – peržvelgti kai kuriuos naujausius teorinius tyrimus VPSP 
tematika, išskiriant potencialią naudą ir iššūkius, taikant privačiojo ir viešojo kapitalo partnerystės modelį 
besikuriančiose ir besivystančiose šalyse. 
Svarbu sąžiningai pasidalinti rizika ir nauda, siekiant sėkmingos VPSP. VPSP partneriai gali būti 
pažeidžiami – tiek privatūs, tiek priimančios valdžios. Vykdant ilgalaikius hidroenerginius ir geoterminius 
projektus, gali kilti ekonominių arba finansinių krizių. Į šią riziką turėtų būti atsižvelgta vykdant projektą. Tai 
gali lemti didesnius grąžos reikalavimus iš privačiojo sektoriaus dalyvių. Rytų Azijos ir Lotynų Amerikos 
krizių pavyzdžiai privatųjį ir viešąjį sektorius bei dvišalius ir daugiašalius paskolų, nuosavo kapitalo ir 
garantijų teikėjus gali išmokyti naudingų dalykų.  
Mažinti nesėkmės riziką, siekiant veiksmingos projekto įmonės veiklos ir valdymo politikos, svarbu vi-
soms dalyvaujančioms šalims. Tačiau perkelti riziką silpnesnei šaliai yra kvescionuotina praktika, pavyzdžiui, 
jeigu apdraustas privačiojo sektoriaus dalyvis paduoda ieškinį prieš priimančią besivystančią valstybę, net 
nepabandęs spręsti problemos, draudikas, kaip TFI arba nacionalinė institucija, nurodo priimančiai šaliai 
atlyginti nuostolius, net nebandydama spręsti nesutarimo. 
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